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Education
Education; California State Lottery-revenue allocations
Government Code § 8880.4 (amended).
AB 2425 (Baca); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1236
Under existing law, eighty-four percent of the annual revenue of the
California State Lottery from the sale of lottery tickets is required to be returned
to the public and the remaining sixteen percent is allocated for Lottery expenses.'
Chapter 1236 requires that all interest earned upon funds held in the State Lottery
Fund will be allocated to benefit public education?
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Prior to fiscal year 1991-92, the Lottery had never exceeded the sixteen
percent statutory limit for administrative expenses and all interest income
generated had been allocated to the Lottery Education Fund? However,
subsequent slow Lottery sales resulted in administrative cost overruns, and
conflicting legal opinions by the State Controller and the Attorney General
created uncertainty as to how interest income generated by the State Lottery Fund
1. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8880.4(a) (amended by Chapter 1236); see id. § 8880A(a)(l) (amended by
Chapter 1236) (stating that 50% of Lottery revenue must be apportioned for the payment of prizes); id. §
8880A(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 1236) (requiring that at least 34% of Lottery revenue be allocated to public
education); id. § 8880.61 (West 1992) (providing that the State Lottery Fund must receive all proceeds from
the sales of lottery tickets or shares and all other money credited to the Lottery from any other source); see also
id. § 8880.65 (West 1992) (mandating that the remaining 34% of Lottery revenue be transferred to the
California State Lottery Education Fund for public education purposes as specified in California Government
Code § 8880.5).
2. Id. § 8880A(a)(4) (amended by Chapter 1236); see id. (specifying that the interest w)ll not be
considered a part of the 34% allocation that is required to be allocated to public education); id. § 8880.4(b)
(amended by Chapter 1236) (noting that Lottery funds allocated to public education are supplemental to other
education funding sources and are not to supplant funds committed for child development programs); see also
ASSEMBLY COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2425, at I (Apr.
12, 1994) (stating that AB 2425 requires interest or unclaimed money to go directly to the Lottery Education
Fund, in addition to the required 34%, and not be allocated for prizes or administrative expenses).
3. Opinion Letter from Gray Davis, Controller, State of California, to Sharon Sharp, Director,
California State Lottery, 1 (June 21, 1993) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal).
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should be allocated.4 Chapter 1236 resolves this conflict by requiring Lottery
interest income to be transferred to the Lottery Education Fund.5
Todd Eberle
Education; children's nutrition-Summer Food Services Program
Education Code § 49547.5 (new).
AB 2917 (Speier); 1994 STAT. Ch. 517
Existing federal law establishes the Summer Food Service Program. ' Existing
California law requires the State Board of Education, 2 in cooperation with the
State Superintendent of Public Instruction,3 to promote the benefits of the federal
Summer Food Services Program to schools and public agencies.4 Additionally,
existing law provides that the State Department of Education (SDE) must seek
specified revisions in federal law relating to the Summer Food Program.6
Furthermore, the SDE is responsible for assisting the federal government in the
preparation and distribution of promotional materials, and in the presentation of
the overall program.7
4. Compare id at 2 (stating the Controller's opinion that 100% of the Lottery interest income should
go to the Lottery Education Fund) with 303 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 1, 1 (1994) (stating that Lottery interest
income can be used for administrative expenses, but only 16% is allowable under California Government Code
§ 8880.4); cf ARiZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 5-505 (1989) (limiting lottery overhead and administrative expenses
at 20% of all lottery revenue sources); IDAHO CODE § 67-7449 (1989) (capping administrative costs to 15%
of lottery revenue during any fiscal year); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch 20, para. 1605/20 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (crediting
interest earnings of the State Lottery Fund to the Common School Fund); OR. REV. STAT. § 461.500(2) (1992)
(allocating no more than 16% of lottery revenues for expenses and specifying that any surplus funds be used
to the benefit of public purpose).
5. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 8880.4(a)(4) (amended by Chapter 1236).
1. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1761 (West 1994); see id § 1761(a)(1) (West 1994) (declaring that the federal
government is authorized to carry out a program to assist the states, through grants-in-aid and other various
means, to initiate, sustain, and expand nonprofit food service programs for children in service institutions).
2. See CAL CONsT. art. 9, § 7 (providing for the creation of the State Board of Education); CAL EDUC.
CODE § 33000 (West 1993) (describing the source of the Board's authority); id. §§ 33030-33041 (West 1993
& Supp. 1994) (stating the powers and duties of the Board).
3. See CAL CONST. art. 9, § 2 (providing for the election of the Superintendent of Public Instruction);
see also CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 56120-56137 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth the creation and the duties
of the Superintendent of Public Instruction).
4. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49548(e) (West 1993).
5. See id. § 33300,33301 (West 1993) (describing the derivation and administration of the SDE).
6. Id. § 49548.2(a)(1)-(2) (West 1993); see id. (requiring the California Department of Education to
seek certain federal statutory amendments).
7. Id. § 49548.3(a) (West 1993).
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Chapter 517 provides that the SDE is the sole state agency for the purposes
of the federal Summer Food Service Program, and is responsible for the
administration of that program!
Existing law sets the rate of reimbursement to child nutrition entitiese for
school, child care, and development program meals.' Additionally, existing law
requires that each school district and county superintendent of schools provide
one nutritionally adequate, free or reduced price meal every school day to needy
children." Furthermore, existing law establishes the rate of reimbursement to
child nutrition entities for those meals, and to school food authorities that
participate in a federal child nutrition program.'2
Chapter 517 states that these provisions do not apply to those meals which are
furnished under the Summer Food Service Program.'3
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 517 is a direct response to the previous underutilization of the
Summer Food Service Program. 4 Chapter 517 aligns California with the majority
of other states, in designating a specific state agency to administer the program. 5
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 517, the program was administered directly by
United States Department of Agriculture.' 6 By placing the administration of the
program directly under state control, the program's participation will be boosted
8. Id. § 49547.5(b) (enacted by Chapter 517); see id. (requiring the SDE to submit to the Western
Regional Office of the Food and Nutrition Service of the United States Department of Agriculture a
comprehensive management and administrative plan, and authorizing the Department to manage and administer
the program, if the proposed plan is approved).
9. See id. § 49530.5 (West 1993) (defining child nutrition entities).
10. Id. § 49536 (West 1993); see Id. (providing that the rate of reimbursement is $0.1135 for each lunch
served, plus an annual adjustment to reflect the changes in the costs associated with operating the program);
id. § 49559 (West 1993) (setting forth the provisions for child care and development allocations).
11. Id. § 49550 (West 1993).
12. Id. § 49559(a) (West 1993).
13. Id. § 49547.5 (enacted by Chapter 517); see id. § 49547.5(c) (enacted by Chapter 517) (providing
that California Education Code §§ 49536, 49550, and 49559 do not apply to the Summer Food Service
Program).
14. Id. § 49547.5(a)(4) (enacted by Chapter 517); see id. (explaining that in California the program is
severely underutilized, and that in California, 1.6 million children receive free and reduced-price school meals,
but only 122,300 (less than eight percent) take part in the Summer Food Services Program); see also Kanika
Jelks, Meal Program Fills Gap While School's Out, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, June 12, 1994, at 1 (stating that
in 1993, nationally, more than 13.2 million children received low-cost or free school lunches daily, but only
2.1 million received summer meals); Edgar Sanchez, Program Fills Kids' Summers, Minds, Bellies,
SACRAMENTO BE, June 30, 1994, at BI (stating that, in the summer of 1994, free lunches were provided at
76 sites throughout Sacramento county).
15. CAL EDUC. CODE § 49547.5(a)(3) (enacted by Chapter 517); cf Mo. ANN. STAT. § 191.810(1)
(Vernon Supp. 1994) (providing that the Missouri Department of Health must establish standards for a summer
food program for eligible children pursuant to the provisions of 42 U.S.C. § 1761); WASH. REv. CODE ANN.
§ 28A.235.155(1) (West Supp. 1994) (stating that the Washington superintendent of public instruction must
administer funding for the federal Summer Food Service Program).
16. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49547.5(a)(3) (enacted by Chapter 517).
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significantly.1 7 Presently, the SDE administers three similar programs. 8 Thus, it
is likely that the SDE is best able to administer the Summer Foods Services
Program.'9
Christian A. Ameri
Education; expulsion of pupils in special education programs for possession
of a dangerous object
Education Code § 48915.6 (new).
AB 3816 (O'Connell); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1287
Under existing law, the principal or school district superintendent is required
to recommend expulsion' of students found to possess a knife or other dangerous
object of no reasonable use to the student either at school or at a school activity.2
If the student possesses a firearm, expulsion or appropriate alternative placement
is mandatory However, students with previously identified exceptional needs
17. Id. § 49547.5(a)(5) (enacted by Chapter 517); see SENATE CoMMrTEE ON EDUCATION, CON ITTEE
ANALYSIS OFAB 2917, at 1-2 (June 29, 1994) (stating that AB 2917 is aimed at improving the delivery and
provisions of the Summer Food Service Program).
18. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49547.5(a)(6) (enacted by Chapter 517); see id. (stating that the SDE currently
administers the National School Lunch Program, the School Breakfast Program, and the Child and Adult Care
Food Program).
19. Id. § 49547.5(a)(5)-(6) (enacted by Chapter 517); see id. (suggesting that since the SDE was
previously charged with the promotion of the program, it is best able to administer the program).
1. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48925(b) (West 1993) (defining expulsion).
2. Id. § 48915(a)(2) (West Supp. 1994); see Cheema v. Thompson, No. 94-16097, 1994 U.S. App.
LEXIS 24160, at *3, *11 (9th Cir. Sept. 2, 1994) (not to be regarded as precedent per Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3)
(allowing a preliminary injunction to keep a California school district from banning Sikh ceremonial knives--
kirpans-from school as dangerous weapons, finding that the school district's no-knives policy burdened the
plaintiff's religious practices and was not shown to be the least restrictive means to achieve school safety). On
remand, the school district must provide evidence that its policy is the least restrictive means of furthering its
compelling interest in safety. Id. at *13 n.6.
3. CAL EDUC. CODE § 48915(b) (West Supp. 1994); see id. (requiring immediate suspension of a
student for possession of a firearm on school grounds or at a school activity; the principal or the school
superintendent is required to recommend the student's expulsion to the governing board); see also Spencer V.
Beni, Review of Selected 1993 Legislation, Education; Expulsion for Possession of Firearms, 25 PAC. L.J.
368, 637 (1994) (reviewing the mandatory expulsion requirements of California Education Code § 48915).
4. See CAL EDUC. CODE § 48915.5(a) (West 1993) (defining "pupil with previously identified
exceptional needs" to be those pupils meeting the requirements of California Education Code § 56026 currently
enrolled in a special education program in either a public or a nonpublic, nonsectarian school); id. § 56026
(West Supp. 1994) (defining an individual with exceptional needs to be one identified by an individualized
education program team as a handicapped child as defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1401(1); excluded are those pupils
who are handicapped by unfamiliarity with the English language, temporary physical disabilities, social
maladjustment, or other environmental, cultural, or economic factors not encompassed by California Education
Code § 56026(a)-(d)).
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enrolled in a special education program may be expelled for possession of a
firearm only if an individualized education program team meeting is held and the
group determines that (1) the misconduct was not caused by the student's
disability, and (2) that the pupil had been placed in the appropriate special
education program.5 All applicable procedural safeguards prescribed by federal
and state law apply, except that parental consent is not required to conduct a
preexpulsion educational assessment or as a condition to a final decision to expel
the pupil.6
Federal law requires that during expulsion proceedings, unless otherwise
agreed among the state or local educational agency and the parents or guardian,
the child must remain in the current educational program? Federal regulations
provide, however, that an educational agency may employ normal procedures to
handle students who are endangering themselves or others! Chapter 1287
provides that the restrictions and special procedures required in order to expel a
5. Id. § 48915.5(a)(2)-(3), (1h) (West 1993); see id. (allowing expulsion only where an individualized
education program team determines the student's misconduct was not related to his disability and that the
student had been appropriately placed; subsection (h) sets forth the steps necessary before an expulsion hearing
may be conducted); id. § 48915.5 (West 1993) (allowing, but not requiring, expulsion under subdivisions (b)
and (c) of California Education Code § 48915 for possession of a firearm or other violation under subdivisions
(a) through (e) of § 48900, which include, inter alia, possession of a dangerous object or involvement with
controlled substances); id. §§ 56340-56345.1 (,Vest 1989 & Supp. 1994) (establishing the individualized
education team for individuals with exceptional needs).
6. Id. § 48915.5(b) (West 1993); see 34 C.F.R. § 104.35 (1993) (providing the federal statute for
preplacement evaluation and placement procedures for pupils believed to need special education because of
a handicap); id. § 300.504 note (1993) (explaining that parental consent is not required for any changes in a
child's special education program after the initial placement, but that written notice is required); CAL. EDUC.
CODE §§ 56321, 56329 (West 1989 & Supp. 1994) (requiring parental notice of an assessment plan whenever
development or revision of the individualized education program is proposed); see also 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415
(West 1990 & Supp. 1994) (providing procedural safeguards to protect the right of a disabled child to a free
appropriate public education, including parental notice whenever an educational agency either proposes or
refuses an initiation or change in the child's educational placement); Hacienda La Puente Unified Sch. Dist.
v. Honig, 976 F.2d 487,494 (9th Cir. 1992) (finding that "previously identified exceptional needs" does not
mean a child must have already been identified as having exceptional needs in order to receive the benefit of
procedural safeguards under California Education Code § 48915.5).
7. 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(3) (West 1990); see id. (requiring that a student "stay put" in a current
educational placement during expulsion proceedings).
8. 34 C.F.R. § 300.513 note (1993); see id. (explaining that although a student's placement may not
be changed, a school is not precluded from using its normal procedures to deal with dangerous children); see
also CAL EDUC. CODE § 48915.5(d) (West 1993) (allowing a suspension of no more than ten consecutive
school days of a student who poses an immediate threat to the safety of himself or others, unless otherwise
agreed to by parents or by court order); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 325 (1988) (stating that as a drastic
measure, a student posing an immediate threat to others' safety may be temporarily suspended for up to ten
school days). The court based its decision that a suspension of up to ten school days would not equal a "change
in placement" as prohibited by 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) on a policy letter from the United States Department
of Education, Office of Special Education Programs. Id. at 325 n.8. See generally Lisa Kline Arnett, Note,
Mootness and the Education for All Handicapped Children Act: Timely Decision Saves Judicial and Social
Costs-Honig v. Doe, 108 S.C. 592 (1988), 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1101 (1989) (reviewing the Honig decision).
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pupil with exceptional needs for possession of a firearm or other dangerous object
will be required only if federal law so mandates
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 1287 was enacted to ensure that students with exceptional needs may
be expelled from school for possessing firearms or other dangerous objects and
to avoid, if possible, their forced readmission under the "stay put"'0 provision of
current law during the required review process." The "stay put" procedural
safeguards were enacted to keep hard-to-handle disabled students from being
excluded from public education. 2
There is disagreement among the United States Circuit Courts of Appeals,
state law, and the United States Department of Education regarding whether or
not the student's dangerous conduct must be related to the student's handicap, in
order for the procedural protections to be triggered." If federal law is interpreted
9. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48915.6 (enacted by Chapter 1287). But see 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415 (West 1990
& Supp. 1994) (providing no exceptions for the requirement of procedural safeguards, whether the disabled
student is expelled for reasons related or unrelated to his or her disability and which represent a danger to
others).
10. See Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 308 (1988) (referring to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(e)(3) as the "so-called
'stay-put' provision").
11. SENATE COMMrrTEE ON EDuCATION, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS oF AB 3816, at 2 (July 6,1994); see
SENATE FLOOR, CoMMrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 3816, at 2 (Aug. 15, 1994) (declaring that the purpose of the bill
is to ensure that all students can be expelled for possession of firearms or other dangerous objects, including
exceptional needs children); Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305,324 (1988) (noting that the drafters of the Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420, recognized that these procedural
safeguards may result in long and tedious proceedings, and allowed for interim placement if parents and school
officials agreed). A temporary suspension of up to 10 school days would allow school officials time to apply
to the courts for an injunction when the parents have refused to permit any change of placement for a truly
dangerous child. Id. at 326.
12. Honig, 484 U.S. at 324; see id. (noting that Congress enacted protections for disabled students
against expulsion which intentionally lack exceptions for dangerous conduct in order to attack the practice of
excluding hard-to-handle disabled students through disciplinary procedures which Congress estimated schools
employed to exclude one out of every eight disabled students); see also Sam Dillon, 15-Year.Old Dies in
Attack in School Hall, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 25, 1993, at BI (reporting the fatal stabbing at a special education
junior high school in which both the victim and his attacker were emotionally handicapped students, and
discussing the problems faced by special education programs); Lynda Richardson, Minority Students Languish
in Special Education System, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1994, at Al (criticizing the special education system and
discussing findings that the majority of children in New York special education classes are classified as either
learning disabled or emotionally disturbed and noting that black children nationwide are twice as likely to be
in special education programs).
13. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48915.5(a)(2) (West 1993); see id. (allowing expulsion where the misconduct
was not related to the student's disability); Virginia Dep't of Educ. v. Riley, 23 F.3d 80, 85-86 (4th Cir. 1994)
(finding that the United States Department of Education was imposing a new condition on the State when it
withheld further funding for special education programs because of the State's policy, already conditionally
approved by the Department, of disciplining a handicapped child in the same manner as a non-handicapped
child when no causal connection was found to exist between the handicap and the misconduct); Doe v. Maher,
793 F.2d 1470, 1482 (9th Cir. 1986) (finding that where a child's misbehavior is determined not to be related
to his handicap, there is no justification for exempting him from the rules as applied to other children, and that
this did not conflict with federal provisions), cert. granted, in part sub nora Honig v, Doe, 479 U.S. 1084
(1987). But see Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485,491 (7th Cir. 1992) (noting that the question
of whether schools must continue to provide services to disabled students expelled for reasons unrelated to their
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to effectively exempt a handicapped child from expulsion, such an interpretation
may be subject to attack on equal protection grounds. t4 Chapter 1287 anticipates
new federal law and seeks to take full advantage of the present lack of clarity in
the law with regard to whether dangerous conduct triggers the procedural
safeguards provided for students with exceptional needs when such conduct is
found not to be related to the student's disability.
5
Molly K. Mosley
Education; school dress codes
Education Code § 35183 (amended).
SB 1269 (Wyman) 1994 STAT. Ch. 325
Existing law declares that "gang-related apparel"' detracts from the health
and safety at schools, and grants school districts the power to adopt dress code
disability had not been considered until 1989 when an unpublished letter from the Department of Education
stated that schools must continue to provide some form of educational services whether or not the misbehavior
was related to the student's disability). This letter was sent by the Office of Special Education and
Rehabilitative Services of the United States Department of Education (OSERS), which administers part B of
the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. §§ 1411-1420. Id. The Office of Special
Education Programs (a division of OSERS) stated that a suspension or expulsion of more than 10 days would
equal a change in placement, thus requiring the procedural safeguards of the IDEA. Id. The court noted that
other courts have held that when misbehavior is unrelated to the handicap, the student may be disciplined
without regard to the fact that the student is disabled. Id. However, the court found no clear basis for this policy
under the IDEA, and reversed in favor of OSERS and the Department of Education's interpretation. Id. at 494.
See generally Honig v. Doe, 484 U.S. 305, 324-25 (1988) (refusing to find an emergency exception for
dangerous students in § 1415 of the IDEA). The Court did not make a distinction between misconduct which
arose out of the student's handicap and misconduct unrelated to the handicap. Id. at 325.
14. Erica Bell, Disciplinary Exclusion of Handicapped Students: An Examination of the Limitations
Imposed by the Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975,51 FORDHAM L. REv. 168, 169 (1982);
see id. (suggesting such a critique on equal protection grounds); see also U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § I
(providing that no State shall deny equal protection of the law to any one within its jurisdiction).
15. Telephone Interview with Dwayne Crenshaw, Legislative Assistant for Assemblymember
O'Connell on AB 3816 (Oct. 12, 1994) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (confirming that the bill
had been written with proposed federal law in mind); see CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48915.6 (enacted by Chapter
1287) (providing that the special restrictions and procedures are to apply only if mandated by federal law); H.R.
6, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. § 17001 (1994) (providing that no assistance will be provided to any school unless
it has a policy which requires any student bringing a weapon to school to be expelled for at least one year)
(emphasis added). See generally Metropolitan Sch. Dist. v. Davila, 969 F.2d 485,489 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding
that the United States Department of Education's unpublished letter is an interpretation of federal law, and
therefore an interpretive rule made pursuant to the administrative agency's authority which is binding on the
parties); Bell, supra note 14 (discussing the different interpretations of the extent and the nature of the limits
imposed by the IDEA on school authorities' power to expel or suspend disabled students).
1. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35294.1(4) (West Supp. 1994) (leaving the definition of gang-related
apparel to the parties developing the school safety plan, but limiting the definition to apparel that could
reasonably be determined to threaten the students' health and safety if worn or displayed).
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regulations prohibiting students from wearing such apparel when necessary to
protect the health and safety of the school environment? The dress code
regulations may be adopted as part of a school's safety plan?
Chapter 325 expands on the Legislature's condemnation of gang-related
apparel, explaining how school dress can relate to violence at school After
drawing the connection between dress and violence, Chapter 325 provides that
in addition to the adoption of a dress code banning gang-related apparel, schools
may adopt a dress code requiring students to wear uniforms for safety reasons5
Chapter 325 requires the school to give parents six months notice prior to the
adoption of a uniform dress code and to have funds available to assist those
students who may be unable to comply for financial reasons.6
Chapter 325 explicitly states that a dress code policy is not in conflict with
California Education Code section 48950, which guarantees students' right to free
expression.7 Under Chapter 325, the school board must provide parents with an
2. Id. § 35183(a)(2), (b) (amended by Chapter 325). See generally Anthony M. Perez, Review of
Selected 1993 California Legislation, Education; School Dress Codes-Gang Related Apparel, 25 PAC. LJ.
368, 643-44 (1994) (reviewing the newly enacted California Education Code § 35183).
3. CAL EDUC. CODE § 35183(b) (amended by Chapter 325); see id. § 35294.1 (West Supp. 1994)
(providing for the development of school safety plans); id. § 35294.1(4) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that
school safety planning may include the establishment of a schoolwide dress code to prohibit students from
wearing "gang-related apparel" and excluding such clothing from protection under California Education Code
§ 48950).
4. Id. § 35183(a)(1), (4), (7) (amended by Chapter 325); see id. (declaring that the Legislature believes
gang regalia projects a message of violence, that weapons can be hidden in certain types of clothing, and that
clothing influences behavior); Wayne D'Orio, Do Clothes Make the Schoolchildren?, N.Y. TIMES, May 22,
1994, at 14CN, I (describing the interaction between clothes and violence or disruption of classroom discipline,
the use of uniforms by some schools, and the need for very specific dress codes to avoid conflict with case law
striking down dress codes which merely enforced good taste); Uniforns for Students Bill Should Be Approved
by Legislature, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., May 8, 1994, at G-2 (advocating school uniforms to improve
discipline, and citing the achievements of a school that did adopt a school uniform policy); George Wil,
Johnson is Worth Watching; Arizona's Honest-to-Goodness New Democrat, ATLANTA J, AND CONST., Mar.
24, 1994, at A16 (describing an Arizona politician's belief that dress codes are good for schools with
disciplinary problems because they weaken gangs, "which build solidarity with their own uniforms"); Scott
Winokur, When Persuasion Fails; Educators Favor Lenient Behavioral Measures, But Most Don't Hesitate
to Get Tough if Kids Still Resist, S.F. EXAmINER, Apr. 27, 1994, at A I (describing the prevalence of violence
in schools and the use of dress codes to prevent students from hiding guns in trendy, oversized pants or shoes,
or showing "colors" indicating gang membership and inciting fights).
5. CAL EDUC. CODE § 35183(b) (amended by Chapter 325); see Nicole Carroll, Schools Using
Uniforms to Address Chronic Problems, USA TODAY, Mar. 16, 1994, at 5D (describing the spread of school
dress codes requiring uniforms for safety reasons); Stephen Price, A Uniforn Response by Schools. Districts
Try Dress Codes to Blur Class Distinctions and Keep Students hi Line, CI. TRII., Jan. 27, 1994, at NWI
(citing improved discipline records where schools have implemented uniform dress codes to increase the safety
of their students); cf LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 17:416.7 (West Supp. 1994) (authorizing a school board to adopt
a dress code, including school uniforms, as it deems necessary; the board must allow each parent to choose
whether or not to use the uniforms).
6. CAt. EDUC. CODE § 35183(d) (amended by Chapter 325).
7. ld. § 35183(c) (amended by Chapter 325); see id. § 48950(a) (West 1993) (prohibiting schools from
sanctioning students solely for conduct or speech that would be constitutionally protected off-campus). But see
Denise Linke, Clothes Encounter; What Kids Can Wear to School; Do Students Have a Constitutional Right
to Dress the Way They Want?, CHI. TRka., Feb. 13, 1994, at D3 (reporting the debate on whether school dress
codes are constitutional, and the opposition of the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) to school dress
codes, based on the ACLU's position that school dress codes do not pass the First Amendment test).
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option to choose not to have their children comply with the dress code policy.8
The dress code policy must state that no student will be discriminated against nor
denied attendance if the student's parents decide not to have their child comply
with the policy.9
COMMENT
Chapter 325 was enacted to clarify legislative policy and statutory intent with
regard to whether dress codes conflict with other law.'0 Despite existing law,
which provides that "gang-related apparel" is not a protected form of speech
under California Education Code section 48950 and which grants schools the
authority to establish dress codes, schools hesitated to establish dress code
policies for fear of violating students' First Amendment rights in light of
decisions such as Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District. "
In Tinker, the Supreme Court stated that students do not shed their constitutional
rights at the schoolhouse gate. 2 If First Amendment rights are involved, courts
have given little weight to fears of interference with the educational process
where those fears are not based on the actual occurrence of such interference. 3
The Supreme Court distinguished Tinker in Bethel School District No. 403
v. Fraser,4 noting that the Tinker court itself separated the nondisruptive, passive
expression of a political viewpoint-which is protected by the First
8. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 35183(e) (amended by Chapter 325).
9. Id. § 35183(f) (amended by Chapter 325).
10. SENATE COMMrITEE ON EDUCATION, COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1269, at 1 (Apr. 6, 1994); see
id. (stating that clarification of the law was necessary to calm schools' fears of abridging the First Amendment
rights of students); Dana Wilkie, Public School Uniforms Bill Passes Senate, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr.
19, 1994, at A3 (reviewing the bill, its purpose, and discussing the arguments for and against the bill). The
arguments against the bill include statements by other senators who fear that the school uniforms represent a
"far right" agenda that imposes "puritanical views" without really attacking the real problems leading to gang
affiliation; the proponents of the bill argue that uniforms foster school spirit, have a positive influence on
behavior, and make outsiders obvious to school officials. Id.
11. SENATE COMMITTEE ON EDUCATION, COMMITrEE ANALYSIS OFSB 1269, at I (Apr. 6. 1994); see
U.S. CONsT. amend. I (prohibiting Congress from making laws that abridge the freedom of speech); CA..
EDUc. CODE § 35294.1(a)(4) (West Supp. 1994), id. § 48950(a) (West 1993) (denying schools the power to
discipline students for communication that otherwise would be protected from governmental restriction by the
federal or state constitutions); see also Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Comm. Sch. Distr., 393 U.S. 503, 508
(1969) (finding that students' First Amendment rights were abridged when a school refused to allow them to
wear black armbands in political protest); Montalvo v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 21 Cal. App.
3d 323, 329-30, 98 Cal. Rptr. 593,597 (1971) (stating that students have rights that are protected under both
the federal and state constitutions), reh'g denied; SENATE RULES COMMITTEE, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OF SB
1269, at 3 (Apr. 18, 1994) (stating that the American Civil Liberties Union opposes dress codes because they
cut off an avenue by which students may express themselves politically through message clothing, thereby
limiting the First Amendment rights of students). See generally Dave Ferman, Dress Codes: Students' Freedom
Regarding Choice of Clothing an Ongoing Battleground, HOUSTON CHRON., Feb. 10, 1994, Fashion 7
(discussing dress codes and their constitutionality as well as their relationship to issues of race and cultural
norms).
12. Tinker, 393 U.S. at 506.
13. Montalvo, 21 Cal. App. 3d at 332, 98 Cal. RpIr. at 599.
14. 478 U.S. 675 (1986).
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Amendment-from speech or action that interferes with the educational process
or other students' rights."5 In Fraser, the Court held that a two-day suspension of
a student who made a lewd and sexually suggestive speech during a high school
assembly was a permissible sanction.' 6 According to the Court, the school board
may have chosen to sanction the speech to teach shared values, and to avoid insult
and harm to the young audience.'7
In a recent federal case, Pyle v. South Hadley School Community,'8 a federal
district court ruled that schools may impose dress code limitations in order to
protect students and to improve the educational environment. 9 In Pyle, two minor
high school students were prohibited by the school from wearing lewd T-shirts
to school?0 The court drew a distinction between wearing vulgar T-shirts and
political expression protected by the First Amendment, holding that schools have
the authority to sanction speech that undermines the school's educational mission
and is unrelated to political viewpoint 2' After giving great weight to testimony
supporting the school's contention that the sexually provocative T-shirts
demeaned female students and interfered with the ability to learn, the court
deferred to the school administration's decision as an action designed to protect
students and enhance the educational environment.22
Thus, dress is not always an expression of speech within the protection of the
First Amendment.? However, choice of clothing and overall appearance are
protected against arbitrary state action under the Fourteenth Amendment as
liberty interests.24 Under certain circumstances, these individual liberty interests
are outweighed by competing public policy interests.25
15. Fraser, 478 U.S. at 680.
16. Id. at 685.
17. Id. at 683.
18. 824 F. Supp. 7 (D. Mass. 1993).
19. Pyle, 824 F. Supp. at 11; see id. (denying a motion for a temporary restraining order against the
defendant school district to allow the students to wear the offensive T-shirts).
20. Id. at 8.
21. Id at 8-9; see id. at 9 (stating that if school officials decide that vulgar and lewd speech undermines
the school's educational mission, the officials may prohibit such speech without breaching students' First
Amendment rights (quoting Bethel Sch. Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 685 (1986))); id. at 10 (finding
that Pyle is more similar to Fraser than to Tinker).
22. Id. at 10.
23. Montalvo v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ., 21 Cal. App. 3d 323,334,98 Cal. Rptr. 593,
600 (1971), reh'g denied, Jan. 13, 1972.
24. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (prohibiting a state from depriving any person of life, liberty, or
property without due process of law); see also In re Alcala, 222 Cal. App. 3d 345, 364,271 Cal. Rptr. 674,686
(1990) (discussing clothing choice as a protected liberty interest); Jensen v. Superior Court, 154 Cal. App. 3d
533,555,201 Cal. Rptr. 275,281 (1984) (lifting an injunction against wearing a turban in court as a practicing
lawyer so long as it is not disruptive); Montalvo, 21 Cal. App. 3d at 334, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 600 (agreeing with
a line of cases that held that certain activities, such as what one wears, are liberty interests protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment).
25. See Alcala, 222 Cal. App. 3d at 377,271 Cal. Rptr. at 695 (holding that a prisoner's right to choose
his or her clothing is subject to the more important interests of institutional security). Civilian clothing can be
useful in escape attempts, and it can act as a catalyst to fighting between gang members as well as creating
jealousy. Id.; see also Colorado Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Barber, 864 S.W.2d 806, 808 (Tex. Ct. App. 1993)
(reversing a lower court's ruling that the school's dress code prohibiting males from having long hair or
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In Montalvo v. Madera Unified School District Board of Education,26 the
court held that a school had not violated male students' constitutional rights when
it regulated their hair lengthy In that case, the fourteen-year-old plaintiff was
suspended from school for three days for his failure to comply with the school's
regulations requiring boys' hair to be kept clean and cut above the eyes, ears, and
collars.' The test applied in Montalvo was to inquire whether the school could
show that the regulation had some reasonable relationship to the school's
legitimate concems. 2' Deferring to the administrative judgment and expertise of
school officials, the court balanced the school's interest in maintaining discipline
and protecting the health and safety of its students against the plaintiff's desire to
wear his hair long.3
Thus, the right to a safe and effective education is one of those public policy
interests that can outweigh individual interests.3 ' In light of these rulings, and also
because Chapter 325 does not allow a school to force compliance with a dress
code, Chapter 325 should not be vulnerable to constitutional attack.3
Molly K. Mosley
wearing earrings was sexually discriminatory and therefore violated the Texas Equal Rights Amendment, as
well as the students' rights to privacy, freedom of speech, and an education under the Texas Constitution), writ
granted, Barber v. Colorado Indep. Sch. Dist., 37 Tex. Sup. CL J. 963 (1994). The court found there were
compelling reasons for the dress code and reviewed a line of federal and state cases upholding the regulations
adopted by school districts for the support and maintenance of efficient schools. Barber, 864 S.W.2d at 807.
These cases allowed censorship of school newspapers, discipline of vulgar language, lesser protection from
search-and-seizure, and regulation of hair length. Id. Mississippi Employment Security Commission. v.
McGlothin, 556 So. 2d 324,328 (Miss. 1990) (reaffirming school authority to enforce a reasonable dress code
as long as it is supported by a "compelling governmental interest reasonably related to [the] educational
mission" and employs the least restrictive means available to do so), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 879 (1990).
26. 21 Cal. App. 3d 323,98 Cal. Rptr. 593 (1971), reh'g denied, Jan. 13, 1972.
27. Montalvo, 21 Cal. App. 3d at 330,98 Cal. Rptr. at 597.
28. Id. at 328, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 596.
29. Id. at 335,98 Ca]. Rptr. at 601; see id. at 334, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 600-01 (rejecting a First Amendment
analysis and agreeing with the line of cases that hold that dress, which is not intended to be an expression of
any particular social or political point of view, is protected as a liberty interest under the Fourteenth
Amendment); id. at 334, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 601 (reasoning that without such a test, schools would be laboring
under too heavy a burden to justify their regulations and would be unable to prohibit bare-chested males or see-
through blouses).
30. Id. at 336, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 602; see id. (reviewing testimony that long male hair would create a
safety hazard in the science laboratory and the shop classes-a danger which could not easily be avoided by
using hair nets because students would not want to wear them-and that, in general, long male hair would
cause undue disruption).
31. See id. at 330, 98 Cal. Rptr. at 597 (upholding as constitutional the regulation of hair length by a
school, stating that "a student may be subject to far more stringent regulations than an adult.., in a school
environment where disciplinary and health problems and considerations relating to safety of minors take on
special significance").
32. See CAL EDUC. CODE § 35183(e)-(f) (amended by Chapter 325) (requiring alternatives to be
provided for parents who choose not to have their children comply with a school uniform policy and
prohibiting the penalization and exclusion of such students).
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Education; security departments and reserve officers
Penal Code § 830.6 (amended).
SBX 48 (Kopp); 1994 STAT. Ch. 26X
Education Code §§ 35021.5 (new), 39670 (amended); Penal Code §
832.2 (amended).
SB 281 (Ayala); 1994 STAT. Ch. 117
Existing law authorizes school districts to establish security departments and
employ personnel to ensure the safety of school employees, pupils, and property.'
Existing law provides that various state and local governmental agencies are
authorized to appoint reserve or auxiliary peace officers, whose authority extends
only for the duration of their specific assignment.' Existing law also provides that
qualified individuals who are assigned to the prevention and detection of crime
1. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 39670 (amended by Chapter 117); see id. § 39671 (West 1993) (providing that
persons employed as members of a school district police department are peace officers for the purposes of
carrying out their duties of employment); CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.32 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that
officers for school districts may carry firearms only under certain terms and conditions specified by their
employer and if authorized to do so); id. (providing that the authority of school district police extends to any
place in the state for the purpose of performing their primary duty or when making an arrest pursuant to
California Penal Code § 836 as to any public offense with respect to which there is immediate danger to person
or property, or to prevent the escape of the perpetrator of that offense, or pursuant to California Government
Code §§ 8597, 8598); see also 58 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 363, 363-66 (1975) (describing the scope of a school
security patrol's authority and concluding that such officer's jurisdiction is limited to offenses against school
personnel, pupils, or property and is always supplementary to the function of law enforcement agencies);
SENATE JUDtCIARY COMMITTEE, CoMMsTaEE ANALYSIS OF SB 281, at 2 (June 14, 1994) (stating that police
officers of school district departments are limited peace officers having the right to, inter alia, arrest individuals
and issue citations); cf. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 72330 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that the governing board of
a community college district may establish a community college police department and may employ personnel
as necessary to enforce the law on or near the college campus); IND. CODE ANN. § 36-8-3-7(c) (West 1983)
(setting forth the duties and powers of officers appointed to serve as security police, which include protecting
school children and employees and safeguarding school property); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 360.18 (West
Supp. 1994) (authorizing the Board of Education of a public school district to establish campus police
departments pursuant to the provisions of the Oklahoma Campus Security Act). But see 51 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen.
213, 215 (1968) (providing that crossing guards may not be assigned to security patrols that have been
established for the purpose of protecting school property and personnel on or around school premises because
their duties are thought to arise from a civil responsibility).
2. CAL PENALCODE § 830.6 (amended by Chapter 26X); see id. §§ 830.31-832.9 (West Supp. 1994)
(designating the individuals that are to be considered peace officers and describing the extension of their
authority and required training); 55 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 198, 200 (1972) (concluding that security officers
employed by Del Monte, a private employer, could not be classified as peace officers because the specific tasks
and duties these officers were responsible for were assigned by a private employer and not by a sheriff and
because peace officer status can only be vested for a limited duration); cf. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.902
(Baldwin 1990) (providing that special law enforcement officers may be commissioned by the secretary of the
Department of Justice in order to enforce the law or protect public property); id. § 61.900(6)(e) (Baldwin 1990)
(classifying public school district security officers as special law enforcement officers); LA. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 40:1379.4 (West 1992) (granting the Department of Public Safety the authority to issue a reserve officer's
commission to retired state policemen in order to utilize their training, experience, and skills); OKLA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 19, § 547(A) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that the sheriff or undersheriff may deputize certain
persons to do particular acts); id. § 547(B) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that a sheriff may deputize as many
reserve force sheriffs as are necessary to preserve the peace and dignity of the county).
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and the general enforcement of the laws of this state are to be considered peace
officers under specified circumstances.' Chapter 117 authorizes a school district
to establish an unpaid volunteer school police reserve officer corps and to
deputize individuals as school police reserve officers, who shall be designated as
peace officers.4 Chapter 117 further provides that a school district may assign a
deputized reserve officer to a schoolsite to supplement the duties of school police
personnel
3. CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.6(a)(2) (amended by Chapter 26X); see id. § 832.6 (West Supp. 1994)
(enumerating the conditions and requirements which must be fulfilled in order for the reserve deputy or officer
to have the powers of a peace officer); id. § 832.6(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that the requirements
to be classified as a peace officer include being deputized or appointed and assigned to the prevention and
detection of crime and the general enforcement of the laws of this state, and completion of the basic training
prescribed by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training); id. § 832.6(a)(2) (West Supp. 1994)
(providing that an individual can be classified as a peace officer if he or she is assigned to the prevention and
detection of crime and the general enforcement of the laws of this state while immediately supervised by a
peace officer with a basic certificate issued by the Commission and he or she has completed the course required
by California Penal Code § 832 as well as any other training prescribed by the Commission); id. § 832.6(a)(3)
(West Supp. 1994) (providing that an individual can be classified as a peace officer if he or she is deployed
and authorized only to carry out limited duties not requiring general law enforcement powers in their routine
performance); id. § 832.6(a)(4) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that an individual can be classified as a peace
officer if he or she is assigned to the prevention and detection of a particular crime or individual while being
supervised by a California peace officer); see also Kirkpatrick v. Ruth H., 26 Cal. App. 3d 77, 81, 102 Cal.
Rptr. 534, 536 (1972) (providing that a high school resident security guard was a peace officer who was
authorized to make an arrest as long as he had reasonable cause to believe that the arrestee had committed a
felony).
4. CAL EDUC. CODE § 35021.5 (enacted by Chapter 117); see CAL. PENAL CODE § 830.6(a)(1)
(amended by Chapter 26) (stating that school reserve officers will be designated as peace officers if specific
qualifications are fulfilled); id. § 832.6 (West Supp. 1994) (setting forth the conditions that must be fulfilled
in order for a reserve officer to be classified as a peace officer); id. § 832.6(a)(1) (West Supp. 1994)(providing
that an individual will have the powers of a peace officer when that individual has completed the basic training
prescribed by the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training (Commission), is deputized pursuant
to California Penal Code § 830.6, assigned to the prevention and detection of crime and general enforcement
of the state's laws); id. § 832.6(a)(2) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that an individual will have the powers of
a peace officer when that individual has completed the course required by California Penal Code § 832 and any
other training prescribed by the Commission and that individual is assigned to the prevention and detection
of crime and general enforcement of the state's laws and is under the immediate supervision of a peace officer
with a basic certificate issued by the Commission); id. § 832.6(a)(3) (West Supp. 1994) (providing that an
individual will have the powers of a peace officer when the individual has completed training required by the
Commission and is deployed and authorized only to carry out limited duties not requiring general law
enforcement powers in their routine performance and those duties are performed under the direct supervision
of a peace officer who has a basic certificate issued by the Commission); id. § 832.6(a)(4) (West Supp. 1994)
(providing that an individual shall have the powers of a peace officer when assigned to the prevention and
detection of a particular crime or crimes or to the detection or apprehension of a particular individual while
working under the supervision of a California peace officer in a county adjacent to the state border who
possesses a basic certificate issued by the Commission).
5. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 39670(a) (amended by Chapter 117); see People v. Frederick B., 192 Cal. App.
3d 79, 88, 237 Cal. Rptr. 338, 344 (1987) (discussing the scope of school security guards' authority and stating
that they are denied general police powers in order to ensure that they do not supplant city and county law
enforcement agencies); id. at 88-89, 237 Cal. Rptr. at 344 (providing that the duties of school security guards
are defined by the district which employs them and are confined to the performance of those duties alone); see
also 56 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 390,390 (1973) (declaring that a sheriff may assign continuous law enforcement
duties to reserve deputies paid by another entity); id. at 392 (providing that these officers are classified as peace
officers while performing the duties assigned by the sheriff and performed on his behalf).
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Existing law requires that school peace officers receive specified training in
order to ensure that they will be able to effectively manage the diverse situations
6which they encounter. Chapter 117 mandates that school police reserve officers
complete this specified training!
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Because of the increase in crimes committed by juveniles, legislative
intervention has been perceived as necessary in order to combat violence, crime,
and drug usage in schools.8 According to the Legislature, the safety and security
of public school children, while on campus and when traveling between home and
school, are increasingly at risk and school district personnel also face increasing
risks of violence while performing their official duties.9 Additionally, the use of
6. CAL PENALCODE § 832.2 (amended by Chapter 117); see id. § 832.2(b) (amended by Chapter 117)
(providing that the Commission on Peace Officer Standards and Training must develop and approve the course
of training and must consult with school peace officers regarding the content and hourly requirement for this
course); id (providing that the school peace officer training course must address guidelines and procedures for
reporting offenses to other law enforcement agencies that deal with violence on campus and other school
related matters); see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 11, § 1081 (1994) (setting forth minimum standards for the
content and hours that mandated peace officer training must meet). See generally Jeffrey W. Daly, Review of
Selected 1991 Legislation, Public Entities, Officers, and Employees; Peace Officers-Requalification
Requirements, 23 PAC. LJ. 510,762 (1992) (discussing the training courses that peace officers are mandated
to complete and the time period within which these courses must be completed).
7. CAL. PENAL CODE § 832.2(b) (amended by Chapter 117).
8. ASSEMBLY COMMrrTEE ON EDUCATION, Commrrnit ANALYSIS oFSB 281, at 2 (May 4, 1994); see
id. (providing that a reserve force, composed of unpaid volunteers, can provide much needed assistance in
patrol functions, anti-crime activities, and crowd control during special events); see also CAL. CONST. art. I,
§ 28(c) (providing that all students and staff of public, primary, elementary, junior high and senior high schools
have the inalienable right to attend campuses that are safe, secure, and peaceful); Diane M. Rotondo, Playing
it Safe; School Security, AM. SCH. & U., Oct. 1993, at 28 (discussing the increase of crime and violence in
schools across the nation and the different ways in which the school districts are handling the issue of
protecting students and student facilities); Kimberly A. Sawyer, The Right to Safe Schools: A Newly
Recognized Inalienable Right, 14 PAC. LJ. 1309, 1309-10 (1983) (discussing the constitutionally guaranteed
right to safe schools as established by the Victim's Bill of Rights); cf. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 74, § 360.15-
360.21 (West Supp. 1994) (setting forth the provisions of the Oklahoma Campus Security Act). See generally
Peter D. Blauvelt, The Ultimate Test; School Security, SEC. MGIMT., Sept. 1991, at 89 (discussing security
issues in school systems and the factors to be considered in developing such a system); id. (stating that
responses by schools to security issues must be system-wide decisions and not individual choices); Julius
Menacker & Richard Mertz, State Legislative Responses to School Crime, 85 EDUC. LAW REP. 1 (1993)
(identifying and describing state legislative enactments responding to school crime and violence in an effort
to develop legal policy for controlling school crime); George Nicholson et al., Campus Safety: A Legal
Imperative, 33 EDUC. LAw REP. 981 (1986) (discussing the goal of achieving a safe school environment for
children, and the possibility of character education and citizenship training in school as a means of attaining
this goal); J. Douglas Caywood, Sentencing Reform-The View from Inside: A Prisoner Talks About Bad
Time-Like it or Not, Crime and Punishment Both are Growth Industries, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 14, 1993, at
A9 (discussing and setting forth sentencing reform options, including goal oriented programs and transfers to
community-based programs upon successful completion of education courses or vocational training).
9. 1994 Calif. Legis Serv. ch. 117, sec. 1, at 544. See generally Julius Menacker, Getting Tough on
School-Connected Crime in Illinois, 51 EDUC. LAW REP. 347 (1989) (discussing school related juvenile
violence, drug abuse, and gang activities and the Illinois Legislature's response to it).
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a reserve police force is a widespread practice in California Police Agencies." In
order to ensure that the safety of children and youth is safeguarded and that
schools are provided with the best protection available, and in order to ensure that
all available resources are used to their best capability, the Legislature has granted
through the passage of Chapter 117 the authority for school districts to establish
reserve officers."t
Laura J. Fowler
Education; special education-conformity with Individuals with Disabilities
Act
Education Code § 56363.1 (new); §§ 41401,41881,44265.5,45370,45371,
49060, 49070, 52315, 52860, 56100, 56346, 56426.7, 56426.8, 56426.9,
56429,56440,56441.11,56505,56822,60241,60281,60282,60283,60294,
60312, 60313 (amended).
AB 3235 (Solis); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1288
Existing law exempts community colleges, public and private post-secondary
institutions and other specified schools from provisions governing the
10. 1994 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 117, sec. 1, at 544; see id. (setting forth legislative findings and
declarations); see 56 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 390, 392 (1973) (stating that in enacting statutory provisions
pertaining to reserve officers or deputies, the Legislature clearly intended to facilitate the usage of additional
personnel by local law enforcement agencies). See generally James F. Harrigan & Mary H. Sundance, Private
Police in California: A Legislative Proposal, 5 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 115 (Mark L. Webb ed., 1975)
(discussing the dramatic increase in the number of private police and comparing and contrasting them with
public police officers in relation to their function and their profile).
11. 1994 Calif. Legis. Serv. ch. 117, sec. 1, at 544; see James A. Maloney, Constitutional Problems
Surrounding the Implementation of "Anti-Gang" Regulations in the Public Schools, 75 MARQ. L. REv. 179,
180 (1991) (discussing anti-gang regulations as a means of securing safe schools and the constitutional
questions such provisions raise); Rotondo, supra note 8, at 28 (providing that in order to create an environment
where students feel safe, it is necessary to develop a professionally-operated, well-managed security entity that
works closely with school principals and is under central control with the authority necessary to report every
incident, hold the administrators accountable, and make every incident a priority); cf. LA. REv. STAT. ANN. §
40.1379.4(A) (West 1992) (recognizing that there is a need to use the training, experience, and skills of retired
state police officers in order to aid in enforcing laws and protecting people of the state). See generally George
Nicholson et al., Of Inalienable Rights and Exclusive Remedies, 30 EDuc. LAW REP. 11 (1986) (discussing the
constitutional guarantee of a right to safe schools as provided in the Victim's Bill of Rights); George Nicholson
et al., Safe Schools: Ancient Doctrine Rediscovered, 32 EDUC. LAW RaP. 871 (1986) (discussing steps taken
to restore a safe school environment including constitutional amendments, court decisions, and providing
parents and children with practical safety tips); Denise Baker, Public Safety Programs Nationwide Reach Out
to Youth, NATION'S CrrEs WKLY., July 26, 1993, at 6 (discussing some innovative and successful community
programs which reach beyond the perils of crime and violence in order to attain a better quality of life for its
citizens, especially children); Ted Gest, These Perilous Halls of Learning, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Mar.




confidentiality of student records and parental access to such records.! Under
Chapter 1288, all public agencies that give educational services to students with
disabilities2 will be subject to the disclosure laws of the State of California?
Under existing law, a parent or guardian of a student may correct or remove
information that is within his or her child's permanent record.4 Chapter 1288
enables a parent or guardian of a student with exceptional needs to have the same
right to correct or remove information in the child's permanent record.
Prior law authorized a local district to plan for the education of special
education students for up to three years in the future.6 Under Chapter 1288, a
district is authorized to enact plans for special education for up to four years in
the future.7
Prior law allowed components of an Individual Educational Program (IEP)s
that were not in contention by the student's parent or guardian to be implemented
at the school administrator's discretion? Chapter 1288 no longer allows for
discretion in the implementation of the agreed IEP components; such components
must be implemented without delay."0
Under existing law, all specified children with exceptional needs, between the
ages of three and five, who do not have intensive special educational needs will
be phased into a program providing special education and services." Under
1. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 49060 (amended by Chapter 1288); see id. (listing public community colleges,
public or private institutions of higher education, and governmental or private agencies which receive federal
education funds as exempt from this section).
2. See id. § 56026(a)-(c) (West Supp. 1994) (defining an individual with disabilities as a person who
is, among other things: (1) Identified by an Individual Educational Program (IEP) meeting as a disabled child,
as defined in 20 U.S.C. § 1401; and (2) not able to learn without special instruction which the regular school
program cannot provide); see also id. § 8208 (West Supp. 1994) (defining children with exceptional needs).
3. Id.
4. Id. § 49070 (amended by Chapter 1288); see id. (providing that a parent or guardian may remove
or correct information in the permanent record when the file contains inaccurate information, unsubstantiated
personal statements, statements that have no expert validity, hearsay, misleading information, or when the file
violates the student's right to privacy).
5. Id.
6. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1360, sec. 9, at 5813 (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56100).
7. CAL EDUC. CODE § 56100(c) (amended by Chapter 1288); see id. (requiring the State Board of
Education to adopt size and scope standards to be implemented in the district's long term special education
planning); id. § 56200(a)-(c) (Vest Supp. 1994) (requiring each local plan to: (1) Be in compliance with the
Individuals with Disabilities Education Act; (2) contain a description of services to be provided; and (3) contain
a description on how the plan is to be implemented).
8. See id. § 56345(a)(l)-(6) (West Supp. 1994) (defining the contents of an IEP to include the: (1)
Student's present level of educational performance; (2) goals for the student; (3) instruction and services
necessary for the student; (4) degree to which the child will be in the mainstream classroom; (5) timeline for
implementation and achievement of the goals; and (6) assessment method for the goals).
9. 1980 Cal. Stat. ch. 797, sec. 9, at 2436 (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56346).
10. CAL EDUC. CODE § 56346 (amended by Chapter 1288); see id. (stating that this is done in order
not to delay the student's instruction).
11. Id. § 56440(a) (amended by Chapter 1288); see id. § 56426.8(a) (amended by Chapter 1288)
(mandating that the services provided be based upon the needs of the infant and their family); id. § 56441(a)-
(g) (West Supp. 1994) (listing the reasons to have early childhood programs for special education).
Pacific Law Journal/VoL 26
Education
Chapter 1288, these students will be eligible for the benefits of special education
and not be subject to a phase-in plan. 2
Prior law provided for the granting of a continuance, by the Superintendent
of Public Instruction or his or her designees, of a hearing on a disputed special
education program.'3 Chapter 1288 provides that the hearing officer will grant
such a request.'
4
Under existing law, the State is required to make available to students with
exceptional needs instructional materials that would benefit them in their
learning.' 5 Chapter 1288 includes within the list of instructional materials, sound
recordings, large print textbooks, and books in braille. 6
Existing law requires the state to make available state approved textbooks that
are printed in large print for visually impaired students. 7 Chapter 1288 requires
that other state adopted printed material be available in large print for visually
impaired students.'"
Chapter 1288 also provides that districts are not required to purchase any
specialized medical equipment for any special education student. 9
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 1288 was enacted to bring California into conformity with federal
law under the Individuals with Disabilities Act.20 Conforming with this Act
12. Id. § 56440(d) (amended by Chapter 1288).
13. 1992 Cal. Legis. Serv. ch. 1360, sec. 27 at 5823 (amending CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56505).
14. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 56505(f) (amended by Chapter 1288).
15. Id. § 56822 (amended by Chapter 1288).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 60312 (amended by Chapter 1288).
18. Id.
19. Id. § 56363.1 (enacted by Chapter 1288); see id. (providing that the district is required to purchase
any other special equipment that would assist in the implementation of an IEP); id. (defining excluded medical
equipment as any equipment that benefits the functional abilities of students with disabilities).
20. SENATE Commirrm ON EDUCATION, ComMITTE ANALYSIS of AB 3235, at 3 (June 29, 1994); see
20 U.S.C.A. § 1400 (West Supp. 1994) (creating the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); id. § 1415(a)
(West Supp. 1994) (mandating that all state and local educational agencies comply with the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act in order to receive federal funds); id. § 1415(e)(2) (West 1990) (authorizing the
court to grant relief for violations of this act as it deems appropriate); see also 34 C.F.R. § 300.2(b) (1993)
(mandating that the State plan needs to be submitted to the state education agency on behalf of the entire state
and therefore, the plan applies to all political subdivisions of the state that deal with children with disabilities);
id. § 300.7(a)(1) (1993) (defining children with disabilities as those children who have mental retardation,
hearing impairments, visual impairments, serious emotional disturbances, orthopedic impairments, autism,
traumatic brain injury, other health impairments, specific learning disabilities, deaf-blindness, or multiple
disabilities, and who because of such disabilities need special education); cf. Sacramento City Unified Sch.
Dist. v. Rachel H., 14 F.3d 1398, 1405 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that the placement of a moderately retarded
girl with an I.Q. of 44 in a full-time regular second grade class room with some supplemental service was
appropriate under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act); W.G. v. Board of Trustees of Target Range
Sch. Dist. No. 23, 960 F.2d 1479, 1484 (9th Cir. 1992) (holding that a student's IEP was not valid because
there was no input or participation from the student, parents of the student, or the classroom teacher); Gardner
v. School Bd. Caddo Parish, 958 F.2d 108, 112 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that the parents of a disabled student
who sought the unrestricted right to record parent-teacher conferences did not exhaust all administrative
remedies because they did not file a complaint with the school board before filing a judicial suit); Roland M.
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Education Code §§ 48911.1, 48911.2 (new).
AB 2728 (B. Friedman); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1016
Existing law provides the specific circumstances under which a school
official may suspend a student from school, as well as the procedure for
suspension.' Alternative disciplinary action is provided where suspension is not
required.2 Under existing law, a student may not be suspended without
affording the student with the opportunity for a conference unless it is determined
that an emergency situation exists.3
Chapter 1016 authorizes the creation of separate classrooms for suspended
students if they pose no imminent danger or threat, or against whom no action to
v. Concord Sch. Comm., 910 F.2d 983,987 (Ist Cir. 1990) (specifying that free appropriate public education,
as described in the Education of the Handicapped, requires the states to provide, at public expense, instruction
and support services sufficient to permit the child to benefit educationally from that instruction),
21. SENATE COMMITME ON EDUCATION, COmmrrrEmANALYSIS OFAB 3235, at 3 (June 29, 1994).
1. CAL EDUC. CODE § 48900(a)-(/) (West 1993); see id. § 48925(d) (West 1993) (defining
suspension); see also id. § 48900(a)-() (West 1993) (providing grounds justifying suspension); id. § 48900.5
(West 1993) (providing that a student should be suspended only as a last resort); id. § 48903 (West 1993)
(restricting the number of days a student may be suspended); id. § 48910(a) (Vest 1993) (establishing the
procedure by which a teacher may suspend a student); id. § 48911 (West 1993) (establishing the procedure by
which a principal, principal's designee, or superintendent of schools may suspend a student); id. § 48912 (Vest
1993) (providing for closed hearings to consider a student's suspension); id. § 48913 (West 1993) (allowing
a teacher to require a suspended student to complete the schoolwork missed); id. § 48914 (Vest 1993)
(authorizing establishment of a school policy to permit meetings with the suspended student's parent or
guardian); Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 847 F. Supp. 780,785 (S.D. Cal. 1994) (stating that California
Education Code §§ 48900-48925 were enacted in response to Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975), and
describing §§ 48900 and 48911 as part of a legislative design to ensure fairness in suspension proceedings);
cf. Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 581-82 (1975) (holding that the Due Process Clause requires school
authorities to afford students with notice and a hearing in a suspension proceeding as protection against
unfairness, mistake, and arbitrary exclusion from school).
2. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48900 (West 1993); see id. (stating the Legislature's intent that alternatives
to suspension or expulsion be imposed against a student who violates a school's attendance requirements); id.
§ 48900.6 (West Supp. 1994) (prescribing community service on school grounds as an alternative to suspension
or expulsion, where the latter are not required).
3. Id. § 4891 l(c) (West 1993); see id. (defining an emergency situation as one that presents a clear
and present danger to the lives and safety of others at the school); see also id. § 48911 (d) (West 1993)
(requiring that a reasonable effort be made to contact a suspended student's parent or guardian by telephone
at the time of the suspension, as well as requiring that written notification be sent to the parent or guardian),
Pacific Law Journal/Vol. 26
Education
expel has been initiated.4 The classrooms would allow school districts to claim
apportionments for the suspended students, provided the classrooms meet certain
requirements.5 Students in a suspension classroom would be expected to work on
the assignments and tests they miss during their suspension. 6 The student's parent
or guardian must be notified whenever a student is assigned to a suspension
classroom.
7
A school suspending more than 30% of its enrollment in the prior school year
would be required either to implement the supervised suspension program,8 or
select among alternative disciplinary methods, all of which are to occur on
campus during the school day.9 Such schools are expected to report the rate of
reduction in off-campus suspensions for the academic year as well as the
alternative method of discipline employed. 0
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 1016 was enacted to keep students in school unless they are a threat
to others." Under Chapter 1016, there is clear intent to encourage schools to find
alternatives to off-campus suspensions. 2 Chapter 1016 does not change the
definition of suspension to include reassignment to another educational class at
4. Id. § 48911.1(a) (enacted by Chapter 1016); see id. (authorizing schools to set up supervised
classrooms for students suspended under California Education Code §§ 48900 or 48900.2 who are not
dangerous); cf. FIA. STAT. ANN. § 230.2316(d)(2)-(3) (West Supp. 1994) (providing for in-school suspension
disciplinary programs under the Dropout Prevention Act; such alternative disciplinary programs are to include
counseling and instruction leading to improved behavior); TEx. EDUC. CODF ANN. § 21.301 (West 1987 &
Supp. 1994) (providing for a student's removal to alternative education programs); id. § 21.301(c), (g)(l) (West
1987) (stipulating that before a student may be suspended, alternatives must be considered; options include
alternative education programs such as in-school suspension). See generally James W. McMasters, Comment,
Mediation: New Process for High School Disciplinary Expulsions, 84 NW. U. L. REv. 736 (1990) (discussing
the processes chosen in high school expulsion cases and the procedural due process protections school officials
should provide, balancing the student's interest in education against the school's interest in avoiding
burdensome procedures).
5. CAL EDUC. CODE § 4891 l.1(c)(l)-(4) (enacted by Chapter 1016); see id. (including a requirement
that the classroom be staffed by a full-time, certified teacher).
6. Id. § 4891 1.1(c)(3)-(4) (enacted by Chapter 1016); see id. § 4891 1.1(c)(4) (enacted by Chapter
1016) (providing that a teacher must provide all assignments and tests a student will miss while suspended;
if none have been assigned, the supervising teacher will make assignments).
7. Id. § 48911.1(d) (enacted by Chapter 1016); see id. (requiring that a parent or guardian be notified
either in person or by telephone of the student's assignment to a supervised suspension classroom, and if the
student is assigned to such classroom for more than one class period, requiring written notification to the parent
or guardian).
8. See id. § 48911.2(a)(1) (enacted by Chapter 1016) (providing for the implementation of the
supervised suspension program as set forth in California Education Code § 48911.1).
9. Id. § 48911.2(a) (enacted by Chapter 1016); see id. § 48911.2(a)(2)(A)-(D) (enacted by Chapter
1016) (providing as alternatives to the supervised suspension program the following activities: conferences
between staff, parents and student; referral to support service staff, including a psychologist or child welfare
attendance officer, detention; or study teams or other kinds of teams).
10. Id. § 48911.2(b) (enacted by Chapter 1016); see id. (providing that the report is to be made to the
district superintendent or a comparable administrator).
11. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB 2728, at 2 (June 2, 1994).
12. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 48911.2(a)(2) (enacted by Chapter 1016).
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the same school.13 However, disciplining students by sending them to another
class on campus, as opposed to suspending them off campus, is expected to
permit discipline to be enforced and order maintained in classrooms, while
providing students with supervision and the opportunity to keep pace with the
class. t4
Molly K. Mosley
Education; suspension or expulsion for communication inciting or producing
imminent lawless action
Education Code § 48900.4 (new).
AB 2752 (Allen); 1994 STAT. Ch. 1017
Existing law provides the specific circumstances under which a student may
be suspended or expelled from school, and requires either that alternative methods
of correction be explored or that a student represent an ongoing danger to the
physical safety of others before the student can be expelled.' Existing law also
protects a student's right to engage in expression which would be protected off
13. Id. § 48925(d)(1) (West 1993); see id. (defining suspension as a student's removal from ongoing
instruction for purposes of adjustment, but providing that the definition does not include reassignment to
another educational program at the same school).
14. ASSEMBLYFLOOR, COMMrrEE ANALYSIS OFAB272, at 2 (June 2, 1994); see Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565,575-76 (1975) (discussing the damage done to students by the traditional type of suspension, which
equates to a property deprivation); Michael D. Shear, Schools Adopt Tough Tactics to Reverse Trend of
Violence, WASH. POST, Sept. 2, 1993, at VIO (suggesting that the traditional practice of sending students home
on suspension is no punishment today, when most households lack a stay-at-home parent to supervise the
student); see also Rick Badie, Suspension Room Chills Misbehavior, ORLANDO SENTINELTRIB., Dec. 2, 1990,
at I (reporting the successes and the drawbacks of a new in-house suspension program to punish disruptive
students: students are required to do their work and their attendance records are not affected; however, most
other schools cannot afford the extra teacher required to supervise the class). But see Letter from Warren W.
Quann, Legislative Advocate, California Teachers Association, to Barbara Friedman, Assemblymember,
California State Assembly (July 5, 1994) (copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (expressing the
opposition of the California Teachers Association (CTA) to AB 2728 because of its requirement that teachers
provide all missed assignments and tests to students sent to a suspension classroom, thus failing, in the opinion
of the CTA, to consider the "professional discretion and needs of the classroom teacher"),
1. CAL EDUC. CODE §§ 48900,48900.2,48900.5 (West 1993); see id.§ 48900 (West 1993) (listing
the grounds for suspension or expulsion of a student from school, requiring that the proscribed acts ba related
to school activity or attendance, and stating the Legislature's intent that alternatives to suspension or expulsion
be found to discipline a student who violates attendance requirements); id. § 48900.2 (West 1993) (adding
sexual harassment to acts which constitute grounds for suspension or expulsion); id. § 48900.5 (West 1993)
(describing the circumstances for which a student may be suspended, and making it clear that suspension
should be imposed as a last resort, with certain exceptions); id. § 48915 (West Supp. 1994) (listing the
particular circumstances under which a principal or superintendent of schools must recommend a student's
expulsion).
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school premises.' Under existing law, students are granted the right to exercise
freedom of speech within certain limits.3 Chapter 1017 provides additional
grounds for suspension or expulsion by proscribing the harassment and
intimidation of other students that disrupts the class and creates substantial
disorder and a hostile environment at school.4
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 1017 was conceived in an effort to counteract race-related crime in
California schools.5 The United States Supreme Court has ruled that the First
Amendment, while allowing regulation of speech that provokes violence, does not
allow speech to be singled out for punishment based solely on its content, even
2. Id. § 48950 (West 1993); see id. § 48950(a) (West 1993) (providing that students may not be
punished for communication or conduct which would be protected by the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution or § 2 of article I of the California Constitution); Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867
(1982) (refusing to permit the removal of books from the school library by local school boards merely because
they do not like the ideas expressed in the books); Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 (1969) (grounding
the right to receive information and ideas in the Constitution); Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch.
Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969) (stating that neither students nor teachers lose their constitutional rights to
freedom of speech or expression at the schoolhouse gate); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603
(1967) (noting that a classroom must be a marketplace of ideas where the country's future leaders can be
exposed to a wide and robust exchange of ideas, allowing discovery of truth rather than dogma).
3. CAL EDUC. CODE § 48907 (West 1993); see id. (granting the right to exercise freedom of speech
and of the press, but prohibiting obscene, libelous, or slanderous expression, including material that incites
students and creates "a clear and present danger" of unlawful acts on school grounds, the violation of lawful
school regulations, or the disruption of school operations, and providing legal remedies where that right is
denied); id. § 48950(e) (West 1993) (providing that California Education Code § 48950, which recognizes
students' right to freedom of expression, is subject to § 48907 of the same code); Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395
U.S. 444, 447-48 (1969) (upholding and applying a test that distinguishes between the advocation of force and
violence in the abstract, and the advocation of such force in a concrete effort--likely to be successful-to incite
or produce imminent lawless action); Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (coining the phrase
"clear and present danger" and declaring Congress' right to proscribe free expression under certain
circumstances); see also Bethel Sch. Dist. v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 676-78 (1986) (holding that a high school
administrator properly punished a student for a speech made at an official school assembly because it was lewd
in nature and disrupted the assembly). But see Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 450 (Douglas, J., concurring)
(rejecting and criticizing the clear and present danger test and discussing the development of the doctrine in
case law).
4. CAL EDUC. CODE § 48900.4 (enacted by Chapter 1017); see id. (providing that the harassment,
threats or intimidation must be intentional, and the effect produced must be severe enough to result in a real,
reasonably expected disruption of classroom order and environment). The law is limited to grades 4-12. Id.;
see also id. § 48900.2 (West 1993) (limiting a student's suspension or expulsion on grounds of sexual
harassment to students in grades four through twelve); SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, CoMMrrrEE ANALYSIS
OFAB 2752, at 4 (Aug. 9, 1994) (discussing the reason for the limitation to grades 4-12, which is for the sake
of consistency with age limitations placed on discipline for other types of harassment, such as sexual
harassment). See generally R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 112 S. Ct. 2538, 2542 (1992) (discussing the areas of
speech that are excepted from protection by the First Amendment and, that as such, may be regulated).
5. ASSEMBLY FLOOR, COMMrTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2752, at 1 (June 1, 1994); see id. (commenting
that the purpose of the bill is to combat race-related crimes in school); Letter from Jim Staunton, Principal,
Huntington Beach High School, to Doris Allen, Assemblymember, California State Assembly (May 23, 1994)
(copy on file with the Pacific Law Journal) (explaining the desire to heighten the discipline for students who
incite fights using derogatory racial comments, and giving as an example a fight that resulted when students
made racial remarks against a group of Middle Eastern students who were speaking their native language).
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when it is discriminatory or hateful.6 Chapter 1017, while not specifically
prohibiting race-related hate speech, authorizes schools to place limits on the free
expression of a student in grades four through twelve, by permitting expulsion or
suspension for acts of expression that intentionally provoke disorder in the
classroom, and can be reasonably expected to succeed in creating that disorder.7
Molly K. Mosley
Education; teachers charged with controlled substance offenses
Education Code § 44940 (amended).
AB 2710 (Alpert); 1994 STAT. Ch. 83
Existing law provides that a certificated employee' of a school district2 who
is charged with an optional leave of absence offense3 may be placed on
6. R.A.V., 112 S. Ct. at 2547; see id. (referring to a city ordinance that specified the disfavored topics
of race, religion, or gender); see also United States v. Lee, 6 F.3d 1297, 1302 (8th Cir. 1993) (applying and
interpreting the holding in R.A.V.), cert. deniedsub nom, Lee v. United States, 128 L. Ed. 2d 199 (1994). The
Supreme Court found that cross burning, representative of a discriminatory idea or philosophy, is a protected
form of expressive conduct unless it leads to imminent lawless action. Id.
7. CAL EDuc. CODE § 48900.4 (enacted by Chapter 1017); see id. § 48907 (West 1993) (proscribing
expression which results in substantial disruption of school operations); SENATm JUDICIARY COMMrrrEF,
COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OFAB 2752, at 3 (Aug. 9, 1994) (concluding that the bill appears to be content neutral
on its face, thus avoiding any unconstitutional focus on a certain type of speech); see also Brandenberg, 395
U.S. at 447 (developing a two-pronged test which allows a state to punish the advocacy of lawlessness and
violence only where such advocacy (1) had the goal of producing such action and (2) was likely to succeed);
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 571-72 (1942) (finding that fighting words, or words likely to
cause violence, may be proscribed); Blackwell v. Issaquena County Bd. of Educ., 363 F.2d 749,754 (5th Cir.
1966) (refusing to deny a principal the power to prohibit the wearing of freedom buttons after the wearers
caused an unusual degree of disorder, were undermining authority, and were harassing other students); supra
note 4 (discussing the reasons that fourth through twelfth graders are the focus of the legislation). But see
Tinker, 393 U.S. at 508 (recognizing that words spoken at school that are not in agreement with the views of
another person may cause a disturbance, but that the Constitution requires that the risk be taken for the sake
of free speech); Craig B. Anderson, Note, Political Correctness on College Campuses: Freedom of Speech v.
Doing the Politically Correct Thing, 46 SMU.. L. REV. 171,223 (1992) (discussing freedom of speech at the
university level and concluding that courts have responded negatively to attempts to censor views which some
find offensive).
1. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 90 (West 1994) (providing that with respect to the personnel of school
districts and other educational agencies, the terms certificated and certified have the same meaning); id. §
44002 (West 1993) (defining credential as a document issued by the State Board of Education or the
Commission for Teacher Preparation and Licensing, authorizing a person to engage in the .ervice specified
in the credential); id. §§ 44250-44279 (West 1993 & Supp. 1994) (setting forth provisions of teacher
credentialing and describing the different types).
2. See id. § 44940(c) (amended by Chapter 83) (defining school district as including county offices
of education).
3. See id. § 44940(b) (amended by Chapter 83) (defining charged with an optional leave of absence
offense).
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compulsory leave of absence4 by the governing board of the district.5 Under
existing law, the controlled substance offenses giving rise to optional leaves of
absence include possessing an opium pipe or other paraphernalia used to inject
or smoke specified controlled substances, possessing, selling, or furnishing
marijuana to a minor under fourteen, and planting or cultivating peyote.7 Chapter
83 broadens the scope of controlled substance offenses which give rise to optional
leaves of absence to include possession of certain enumerated substances while
armed with a loaded and operable firearm!
4. See UdL § 44940(d) (amended by Chapter 83) (providing that the governing board of a school district
must immediately place an employee upon compulsory leave of absence for a period of time extending for not
more than 10 days after the date of entry of ajudgment in specified proceedings); id. § 44940.5 (West 1993)
(setting forth the procedures applicable to compulsory leaves of absence).
5. Id. § 44940(e) (amended by Chapter 83); see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11591 (West 1991)
(providing that every Sheriff or Chief of Police who arrests a school employee for any of the controlled
substance offenses must notify the employee's superintendent by telephone as well as in writing of the arrest);
Board of Educ. v. Calderon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 490, 496, 110 Cal. Rptr. 916, 920-21 (1973) (upholding a statute
providing that whenever any certificated employee of the district is charged with committing any sex offense,
the governing board must immediately place the employee on compulsory leave of absence); see also In re
Bristol, 451 N.W.2d 883, 884 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (stating that a school board's decision to place a teacher
on an unrequested leave of absence will not be disturbed on appeal, unless that decision is fraudulent, arbitrary,
or unreasonable); cf. S.C. CODE ANN. § 59-25-430 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (providing that conduct which manifests
unfitness for teaching and which could result in a teacher's dismissal includes, inter alia, conviction of a
violation of federal or state law, and illegal use, sale, or possession of drugs or narcotics). See generally 26 Op.
Cal. Att'y Gen. 118 (1955) (discussing mandatory leaves of absence for pregnant teachers).
6. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44011 (West 1993) (defining controlled substance offense).
7. Id. § 44940(b) (amended by Chapter 83); see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 11357(d) (West
1991) (prohibiting individuals from possessing marijuana on school grounds); id. §§ 11357-11361 (West 1991)
(providing for offenses relating to cultivation, possession and sale of marijuana); id. § 11361 (West 1991)
(providing that an adult who employs or sells marijuana to a minor or who sells or otherwise furnishes or offers
to give any marijuana to a minor under 14 will be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for a period
of three, five, or seven years); id. § 11363 (West 1991) (providing that it is a criminal offense to plant,
cultivate, harvest, dry or process peyote); id. § 11364 (West 1991) (providing that it is a criminal offense to
possess an opium pipe or any other paraphernalia used in injecting or smoking specified controlled substances);
Board of Trustees v. Judge, 50 Cal. App. 3d 920, 923, 123 Cal. Rptr. 830, 832 (1975) (holding that even
though the Legislature has singled out crimes involving marijuana as among those which authorize a school
board to suspend an employee who has been charged with such a crime but not yet convicted, the offense of
cultivation of marijuana does not involve moral turpitude and does not provide a cause for dismissal of a
permanent employee on such grounds); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44424 (Vest 1993) (providing that a
teaching credential must be revoked upon conviction of specified crimes); id. § 87009 (West Supp. 1994)
(providing that conviction of a controlled substance offense crime is sufficient proof of conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude in order to warrant dismissal of a permanent employee); id. § 87405(a) (West Supp.
1994) (providing that community colleges may not employ or retain persons convicted of controlled substance
offenses); id. § 87732 (West Supp. 1994) (providing that grounds for dismissal of a regular employee include
conviction of a felony or of any crime involving moral turpitude as well as immoral or unprofessional conduct).
See generally 39 Op. Cal. Att'y Gen. 304 (1962) (discussing mandatory revocation of teaching credentials
upon conviction of sex offenses); Some Convict Teachers May Get Classrooms, ARZ. REPUBLIC, May 24,
1994, at B3 (discussing the relaxation of Arizona's standards on allowing individuals with criminal
backgrounds to teach).
8. CAL EDUC. CODE § 44940(b) (amended by Chapter 83); see CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §
1137,0.1 (Vest Supp. 1994) (providing that it is a criminal offense to unlawfully possess any amount of a
substance containing cocaine base, cocaine, heroin, methamphetamine, phencyclidine, or cigarettes treated with
phencyclidine while armed with a loaded, operable firearm); see also CAL. EDUC. CODE § 44346(a)(3) (West
1993) (providing that a conviction of a controlled substance offense provides a ground for denial of an




In enacting Chapter 83, the Legislature is attempting to maintain a certain
caliber of teachers certified to teach in public schools.' Because of the influence
teachers have upon their students as role models and because of the
impressionability that students typically possess, it is important that teachers are
held to a certain level of moral as well as law-abiding conduct.' ° Allowing more
offenses to give rise to a leave of absence gives the school board a greater amount
of discretion in disciplining teachers."
Laura J. Fowler
someone convicted of a controlled substance offense, as long as it is determined that the person has been
rehabilitated for at least five years or has received a certificate of rehabilitation and pardon); id. § 44425 (West
1993) (providing that a conviction of a controlled substance offense results in a suspension of the credential,
which will be revoked when the conviction becomes final); cf. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3319.31 (Anderson
Supp. 1993) (providing that the certificate of any teacher who pleads guilty to or is convicted of any felony or
any drug abuse offense that is not a minor misdemeanor may be suspended or revoked); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS
ANN. § 13-42-10 (1991) (providing that the teacher's certificate can be revoked if convicted of any crime
involving moral turpitude, including traffic in narcotics); W. V/A. CODE § 18A-2-8 (1993) (providing that a
board may suspend or dismiss any person for immorality, incompetency, cruelty, insubordination,
intemperance, willful neglect of duty, unsatisfactory performance, the conviction of a felony, or a guilty plea
or a plea of nolo contendere to a felony charge).
9. See Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ., 10 Cal. 3d 29, 36 n.7, 513 P.2d 889, 894 n.7, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665,
670 n.7 (1973) (stating that a teacher whose license had been revoked because she had been charged with oral
copulation was based on her perceived inability to teach moral principles, to act as an exemplar for her pupils,
or to offer them suitable moral guidance).
10. See Board of Educ. v. McCollum, 721 S.W.2d 703, 704-05 (Ky. 1986) (holding that the standard
of personal conduct to which teachers are held does not permit the commission of immoral or criminal acts
because of the harmful impression made on students, and upholding the discharge of a 13-year employee for
taking one sick leave day to drive a coal truck to Ohio); see also Board of Educ. v. Wood, 717 S.W.2d 837,
840 (Ky. 1986) (holding that the school board's power to discipline teachers is based upon the legitimate
interests of the government in protecting the school community and students from harm); Riforgiato v. Board
of Educ., 448 N.Y.S.2d 74,75 (1982) (holding that reprimanding a tenured high school teacher who had been
convicted of a controlled substance offense was too lenient and was an abuse of discretion). But see Comings
v. State Bd. of Educ., 23 Cal. App. 3d 94, 104-05, 100 Cal. Rptr. 73, 81 (1972) (holding that the revocation
of a teacher's certifying documents was inappropriate as a disciplinary measure because it was not shown that
the teacher's conduct adversely affected his students or fellow teachers even though he had been convicted of
a drug offense); Rogliano v. Fayette County Bd. of Educ., 347 S.E.2d 220, 225 (W. Va. 1986) (holding that
a misdemeanor charge of possession of a small amount of marijuana did not warrant dismissal of a teacher who
was above average and well-liked by his students, since the misconduct occurred in private, did not directly
involve any student or school personnel, did not make the teacher a subject of notoriety in the community, and
did not impair his ability to function effectively as a teacher). See generally Don F. Vaccaro, Annotation, Use
of Illegal Drugs as Ground for Dismissal of Teacher, or Denial or Cancellation of Teacher's Certificate, 47
A.L.R. 3D 754 (1973) (discussing whether and under what circumstances the use of illegal drugs constitutes
grounds for dismissal of a teacher, or denial or cancellation of a teacher's certificate).
11. SENATE FLOOR, COMMrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2710, at 2 (May 9, 1994).
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Education; teacher credentialing-limited-English speaking students
Education Code §§ 44253.5,44280 (amended).
AB 2505 (Richter); 1994 STAT. Ch. 157
(Effective July 19, 1994)
Under existing law, the Commission on Teacher Credentialing' is required
to provide certificates to all persons who pass a standardized examination2
showing that they are competent to supply specific instruction to limited-English
speaking students Chapter 157 allows the Commission on Teacher Credentialing
to evaluate a teacher's competency to teach limited-English speaking students in
languages not covered by standardized examinations.4
INTERPRETIVE COMMENT
Chapter 157 was enacted in order to ensure that students who speak
languages, that are not common in California's public school system, receive an
education that is equivalent to those speaking "mainstream" languages. Equity
would be created by allowing teachers to obtain credentials in languages
represented by the student population, but not covered by a standardized test,




1. See CAL EDUC. CODE § 44372(b) (West Supp. 1994) (allowing the Commission on Teacher
Credentialing to establish and modify all teacher credentialing standards).
2. See id. § 44253.5(c)(I)-(6) (amended by Chapter 157) (providing that the test will evaluate the
candidate's ability to effectively teach limited-English proficient students by testing knowledge of first and
second language development, methodology of English development, content instruction in English,
knowledge of the specific language group's culture and cultural diversity, and methodology of content
instruction in the group's primary language).
3. Id. § 44253.5(a) (amended by Chapter 157).
4. Id.; see id. (prescribing that such assessments will be made by organizations having experts in the
language and culture being tested).
5. ASSEMBLY COMMtTTEE ON EDUCATION. COMMITTEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2505, at 2 (Mar. 2, 1994);
see Carlos Alcala, Language Barrier Presents a Growing Challenge, SACRAMENTO BEE, Mar. 13, 1994, at A29
(depicting how a small school district has had a dramatic increase in limited-English proficient students,
especially students from Southeast Asia, such as the Hmong, who number one out of every six students);
Adrienne Mack, Valley Commentary; The Debate on Bilingual Education Polarizes School Faculties, L.A.
TIMES, Mar. 20, 1994, at B19 (illustrating the problems in the Los Angeles Unified School District where 66%
of the district is comprised of limited-English speaking students compared to the statewide ratio of 23% and
that approximately one million students in California have limited-English speaking and writing ability).
6. ASSEMBLY COMMITEE ON EDUCATION, COMMIrEE ANALYSIS OF AB 2505, at 2 (Mar. 2, 1994).
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